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Illustrative scenario

Not based on a specific customer deployment. The company, figures, decisions, and outcomes below are a constructed example that shows how Intended’s mechanism applies to this kind of problem. They are not measured results from a named customer. Where we publish a real, attributed customer outcome, we will say so explicitly.

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Technology

Automating Incident Response with Governed AI Agents

Consider a cybersecurity firm running a 24/7 SOC for many enterprise clients. Its AI agents triage alerts from Splunk, isolate hosts in CrowdStrike, suspend compromised identities in Okta or Entra ID, rotate secrets in Vault, and page on-call engineers through PagerDuty.

01 · the challenge

The kind of problem this addresses.

Slow
minutes from alert to containment with manual SOC processes
Bottleneck
P1 incidents delayed by manual approval queues
No chain
containment actions without cryptographic evidence chains for post-incident review

02 · how it works

See the difference.

Threat detected

Lateral movement from compromised endpoint

Alert fires in SIEM

Priority: P1, but enters analyst queue

Analyst reviews (queue wait)

Queue backlog during off-hours

Manual containment

Analyst isolates the host by hand

Evidence collection

Manual, incomplete, no chain of custody

03 · the solution

What they deployed.

  • — Policy rules for the SOC's detection, containment, and forensics actions
  • — Pre-authorized P1 containment: host isolation, identity suspension, and secret rotation
  • — P2/P3 containment escalates to an analyst in the Intended approval queue
  • — The agents call Intended through the SDK or POST /v1/agent-intent before acting in CrowdStrike, Okta, Entra ID, Vault, PagerDuty, or the cloud consoles, and act with their own API credentials only after an ALLOW and a signed authority token
  • — Intended decides and signs. It never holds the SOC's keys or calls its systems; services that accept containment requests can verify the token offline against Intended's published keys
  • — Every decision lands in a tamper-evident, hash-chained audit trail, and signed authority.decision.created webhooks stream each one to the SIEM pipeline

04 · implementation

From zero to governed.

Week 1

Map

Catalogue the SOC agents' actions across detection, containment, and remediation, and decide which are pre-approved for P1.

Week 2

Configure

Write pre-authorization rules for P1 containment and approval routing for P2/P3. Check them with policy simulation.

Week 3

Integrate

Add the SDK call ahead of the agents' CrowdStrike, Okta, Entra ID, Vault, and PagerDuty actions. Point a webhook endpoint at the SIEM pipeline.

Week 4

Enforce

Enable enforcement. Pre-authorized P1 containment runs without waiting on a human, with its decision record attached.

05 · illustrative outcomes

What this is designed to deliver.

Modeled figures for this scenario — what the workflow above is built to achieve, not measured results from a named customer.

0%

P1 actions pre-authorized

No manual approval bottleneck

0%

Decisions in the audit chain

Hash-chained and tamper-evident

0

Severity tiers

P1 auto, P2/P3 analyst-approved

0 min

Max token lifetime

Each containment token is single-use

06 · decision replay

Example decisions, full trace.

Sample decision records that show the shape of the evidence Intended produces. Illustrative, not drawn from a live customer’s logs.

2026-03-15 02:14:33sec.incident.containmentRISK: 74/100ALLOW

Isolate endpoint WS-ACME-4821 in CrowdStrike: lateral movement detected from compromised credentials

Resolved by: Policy: P1 containment pre-authorized (host isolation)

2026-03-15 02:14:34sec.incident.identity-suspendRISK: 68/100ALLOW

Suspend Okta user jsmith@acme.com: compromised session detected

Resolved by: Policy: P1 identity suspension pre-authorized

2026-03-15 06:33:17sec.incident.containmentRISK: 82/100ESCALATE

Block outbound traffic from subnet 10.4.0.0/24: data exfiltration attempt

Resolved by: SOC Lead (approved subnet isolation)

2026-03-15 09:18:42sec.forensics.evidence-collectionRISK: 45/100ALLOW

Collect memory dump from server DB-PROD-03 for forensic analysis

Resolved by: Policy: forensic collection auto-approved for active incident

2026-03-15 14:22:08sec.remediation.firewall-changeRISK: 88/100ESCALATE

Update firewall rules to block known C2 IPs across all client environments

Resolved by: Security Director (approved global rule change)

the takeaway

Automated containment only works if it is accountable. Pre-authorizing P1 actions removes the approval wait from the most urgent incidents, while every action still carries a signed, policy-checked decision record that a client's security and legal teams can review afterwards.

Why this pattern matters — not a customer quote.

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Intended — The Authority Layer for Autonomous Systems