AWS Connector Setup (Beta)#

Connect Intended to AWS so approved intents can attach an IAM role policy and stop EC2 instances through the real AWS adapter (packages/execution-engine/src/adapters/aws.ts). The adapter uses a hand-rolled SigV4 signer (no AWS SDK on the hot path). Every write is Authority-Token-verified and ESCALATEs for approval under the starter policy.

What the adapter does#

Service hostnames are constructed from pinned constants and the region — never from caller input. region must match ^[a-z]{2}(-[a-z]+)+-\d{1,2}$ (e.g. us-east-1, eu-west-2).

Provider-side steps#

Create a dedicated, least-privilege IAM principal for Intended.

1. Access key ID + secret access key (accessKeyId, secretAccessKey, required)#

1. In the AWS IAM console, create a dedicated IAM user (or role for STS temporary credentials — see session token below).
2. Attach a least-privilege policy granting only the two shipped actions (below), ideally resource-scoped.
3. Under Security credentials → Create access key, copy the Access key ID and Secret access key once.

2. Region (region, required)#

The AWS region token for EC2 operations, e.g. us-east-1. IAM is global (signed in us-east-1 regardless).

3. Session token (sessionToken, optional)#

If you use STS temporary credentials (assume-role), also supply the sessionToken — it is forwarded as x-amz-security-token. Prefer temporary credentials for tighter rotation.

Least-privilege IAM policy#

Matrix scopes for this connector: iam:PutRolePolicy, ec2:StopInstances. Grant only those, scoped to the target role/instances:

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "IntendedPolicyAttach",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "iam:PutRolePolicy",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::<account-id>:role/<target-role>"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "IntendedInstanceStop",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "ec2:StopInstances",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:<region>:<account-id>:instance/*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "IntendedProbe",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "sts:GetCallerIdentity",
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}

sts:GetCallerIdentity is unconditionally allowed for every caller, but listing it documents the probe. Do not attach broad managed policies like AdministratorAccess.

Fields to paste into the connect dialog#

Open Connectors → Connect a system → AWS → Configure auth:

Credentials are stored per-tenant, AES-256-GCM-encrypted, and never displayed back.

Run Test connection#

1. Finish the connect wizard to store the credential.
2. On the connector card, click Test connection.
3. The adapter performs STS GetCallerIdentity, SigV4-signed. A green result means the keys are valid and the signature verified.

Next steps#

• Connectors index — all 15 connector guides
• Enterprise-System Connectors (Beta) — shared reference
• Capability Truth Matrix — per-connector status